TRABAJO FIN DE GRADO

TITLE:

The Armed Internal Conflict in Colombia and the Peace Process with FARC-EP and the Colombian Government: A Case Study on the Work of the Security Council Towards Implementing the Colombian Peace Process.

AUTHOR: Cecilie Rystad

TUTOR: Alonso Munoz Perez

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FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y DE LA COMUNICACION UNIVERSIDAD
ERUOPEA DE MADRID

ABSTRACT

The internal armed conflict in Colombia has been going on for decades, and numerous failed peace negotiations have occurred. Constant tensions between guerilla groups and the Government have left behind thousands of people killed, hundred thousand internally displaced, and the rural population suffering. Finally, in 2016 was, FARC and the Colombian Government under President Santos's regime able to negotiate and agree on a joint peace agreement. FARC, at that time, was Colombia's largest and most violent armed guerilla group. The peace agreement was set to be implemented after the mutual signature by FARC and the Government. The parties involved asked the UN and UN security council to act as a mechanism for verifying the implementation process. One of the conditions in the Final Agreement was that the UN-SC would establish a verification mission in Colombia. The verification mission was established to facilitate the disarmament of former FARC soldiers and ensure the FARC's reintegration into civilian: economic, social, and political life. In addition, to ensure fairness towards the former soldiers and victims of the violence. The conditions of a verification mission were agreed upon between FARC and the Colombian Government, and the parties wished that the SC would act as an intermediary. The goals were to ensure that the implementation of the peace agreement was on the right track. The SC arranges four meetings annually in the council and is responsible for renewing and possibly expanding the verification missions mandate. Furthermore, the council has become an arena for discussing developments for implementing the peace agreement. This paper will argue that the verification mission and the UN-SC supervision of the implementation have been a success. The SC has played a crucial role in the implementation phase of the peace process.

Keywords: UN-SC, Peace Process, Colombia, International support, verification mission

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION	ENGLISH	SPANISH
AU	African Union	Unión Africana
AUC	United Self-defense of Colombia	*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States	Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y caribeños
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Desarme, desmovilización y reintegración
ELN	National Liberation Army	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EU	European Union	Unión Europea
FARC-EP	Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia - People's Army	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	Comité International de la Cruz Roja
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices	Dispositivos explosivos improvisados
IO	International Organizations	Organizaciones internacionales
M-19	April 19 Movement	Movimiento 19 de Abril
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism	Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación
NOREF	Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution	Centro Noruego para la resolución de conflictos

OEDC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos
PNIS	National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops	Programa Nacional de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos
RRI	Reintegration Rural Reform	Reintegración Reforma Rural
SC	Security Council	Consejo de Seguridad
SJP	Special Jurisdiction for Peace	Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz
UK	United Kingdom	Reino Unido
UN	United Nations	Organización de Naciones Unidas
UP	Patriotic Union	Unión Patriótica
US	United States	Estados Unidos

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1. INTRODUCTION

"The Agreement offers Colombia much more than the termination of conflict. It is an opportunity in which Colombia is determined to build a more united, inclusive, and resilient society capable of meeting the common challenges that affect all nations (United Nations, n.d.-b)".

The armed conflict in Colombia has been long and complicated. However, in 2016, the Colombian Government and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia - People's Army (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, FARC-EP[1]), with the help of international mediation, managed after intensive negotiation to agree on a comprehensive peace agreement. This was done with the help of international mediation. Colombia's armed conflict is rooted in severe political disagreement and struggles between the urban and rural areas.

After the peace agreement was signed in 2016, mutual measures for implementing the agreement were put in place. The agreement is a product of a "pioneering negotiation framework aimed at addressing the victim's interests and resolving the conflict's structural causes (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021, p.1)". The international community has played a significant role in the pre-and post-implementation of the peace process. Many scholars argue that if it had not been for the international community, particularly the security council, the comprehensive peace agreement would never have been implemented as it is today.

This paper will discuss the importance of the United Nations (UN) and the security council's (SC) role in verifying the peace process implementation in Colombia. Furthermore, this paper will evaluate the importance of the council in the implementation process and evaluate if the work of the SC can be used as guidance or a framework for further implementation of future peace processes.

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[1] Henceforth, will FARC-EP only be referred to with the acronym FARC.

1.1 Research questions

This paper will aim to answer the research question: *to what extent has it been important to receive support from the UN and the UN security council, to facilitate the verification of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement?* To answer this question, it is vital first to describe and understand how the peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian Government came to be. Secondly, it will be important to look at what the comprehensive agreement discusses. Lastly, the paper will discuss the role of the UN-SC and how they have helped facilitate the verification of the implementation process in Colombia. This is to understand if the SC has been an important arena and an effective mechanism in ensuring that the peace process in Colombia is fully implemented and brought to its logical conclusion.

The paper will also aim to understand how and if the SC has been an essential factor in Colombia's post-peace agreement phase. The paper will also briefly look at the role and work of Norway and Cuba to understand the importance of international intervention in peace processes. Furthermore, understand what tasks the council has been asked to do. Another question the paper would seek to answer is if the work of the SC in verifying the implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia, is something one can take lessons from. Furthermore, if a verification mission can become a standard practice for similar conflict situations in the future.

1.2 Justification and objectives

The goal of this paper is to understand the importance of external support when implementing a peace agreement. The study aims to go into depth to analyze if international organizations such as the United Nations and especially the UN security council can be crucial actors when it comes to implementing a peace agreement. If a country is prone to violence, can the intervention of international actors, such as the one mentioned, help promote lasting peace? Furthermore, the paper aims to understand if the

implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia would have succeeded without the help of the UN and UN-SC.

This paper will limit itself to not going into detail about the definitive progress of peace in Colombia. The paper will not discuss or evaluate the eventual escalation or decrease in violence due to the peace process. However, it will evaluate the implementations of the peace deal and the mechanisms that make up the implementation process. Evaluating the actors and their role in the implementation process to understand whether they have been crucial. The paper limits itself and does not discuss if other mechanisms could have worked better in Colombia.

1.3 Methodology

The research in this paper is part of what one can categorize as descriptive research. There will be a systematic collection of information about the subject at hand. This will later be evaluated by answering the research question along with some other questions. In this paper, the use of information provided by governmental sources will be closely evaluated. Furthermore, information provided by international organizations like the United Nations will subsequently be used. Information taken from an interview is also highly valued throughout his paper. The interview is from a talk hosted at the London School of Economics. The author was fortunate to take part in this talk and was able to ask the interviewee a few questions.

This paper will adopt a qualitative technique requiring the writer to provide a brief case study on the issue. The paper helps to inform the reader about the current situation in Colombia. This is done by providing a detailed summary of the history to understand how the situation has escalated into what it is today. The qualitative technique used in this paper embraces the use of interviews and evaluation of previous speeches to provide a detailed picture of the issue at hand.

1.3.1 Primary sources and secondary sources

This paper will use a mixture of both primary and secondary sources. The sources used in this paper will contain preliminary information from a talk the author was fortunate to participate in. The author was also able to ask the person speaking in the talk questions. Furthermore, official governmental documents and reports, speeches from UN meetings, and scholarly journal articles will be used. Some of the secondary sources used contain information from books, magazines, and encyclopedia entries. Depending on the discipline, scholarly journal articles might be either primary or secondary sources. There is extensive use of documentation, resolutions, press releases, and reports used from the United Nations in this paper. Furthermore, the author used quotes from speeches at open meetings in the United Nations.

The author acknowledges that fake information is something to be conscious of. It has become substantially important through this paper to evaluate everything that is found and use trusted and credible sources. In order to make sure that the information provided is correct and not misinterpreted. Furthermore, is the use of other scholars' work carefully cited in the bibliography.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used in this paper will build on understanding what a conflict is along with conflict resolution. This is to understand how violence towards state-building, transnational justice, international mediation, and peace processes work and interlink. Literature on these topics is abundant and will be used to evaluate the chance of upkeeping a peace process in places with ongoing conflict. Finally, the information gathered will be used to evaluate the conflict in Colombia further to understand how the implementation of the peace agreement has been facilitated in the country. This is to be done through a large focus on international mediation through the help of international organizations.

International relations theory allows us to understand the international world through different lenses. Each of these lenses represents a different and distinct theory. Two of the most traditional theories are realism and liberalism (Gold & McGlinchey, 2017), where the paper will adopt more of a liberal view. Liberalism ensures that people have the right to life, liberty, and property as the highest form of Government (Meiser, 2018).

2.1 Conflict

2.1.1 Conflict theory

Literature on conflict theory is abundant, especially when it comes to an understanding of how conflicts play out on an international scale. One can find theories from numerous scholars. To understand conflicts, it is vital to understand the concept of conflict and to differentiate between the different conflicts that can be found.

Conflict theory was first developed by the prominent scholar Karl Marx. His theory discussed that societies are always in a state of perpetual conflict due to competition for limited resources (Hayes, 2022). The Marxian theory promotes the idea that the ones that hold much of the wealth and power will be the ones who have the ability to suppress the poor and powerless. This eventually leads to competition for resources among groups within a society. Marxist conflict theory has deep roots in the struggle between different classes and groups in society (Hayes, 2022).

A conflict can be defined as an act that is the "result of a disagreement between actors based on perceived incompatible goals (Herbert, 2022)". In other words, a conflict often occurs when two actors disagree about their ideas or ways of doing something. Al-Rawashdeh and Al-Majali (2017) build on the idea that a conflict is a "competitive phenomenon that involves two or more conflicting goals (Al-Rawashdeh and Al-Majali, 2017, p. 3488)". Bell (2015) argues that an actor in a conflict is "defined as having caused more than 25 conflict-related deaths in one calendar year (Bell, 2015, p. 5)".

2.1.2 Classification of conflicts

Conflict is a multidimensional notion that can be categorized into many different concepts in international relations theory. The concepts that describe the different types of conflict in this paper will be explained below and defined as asymmetric, violent, and internal conflicts.

Violent conflict:

A violent conflict, according to Frere & Wilen (2015), can be understood as a conflict that involves at least "two or more parties that use physical force to resolve competing claims or interests (Frere & Wilen, 2015, p. 2)". Physical force can be seen using guns, knives, and missiles or fist fighting. Frere and Wilen (2015) argue that the distinction that differentiates asymmetric violent conflicts from others is the uneven balance of power between opposing factions. Arguing that in a symmetric violent conflict, there is often an even balance of financial, material, or technical power capabilities. Resulting in asymmetric conflicts being more violent than others.

Asymmetric conflict:

An uneven power balance is categorized as an asymmetric conflict. This can be seen when there is a significant power imbalance. One actor typically has the upper hand regarding the power hold of capabilities. The most common actor in such conflicts is insurgencies. Unal (2016) states that insurgencies are political movements aiming to achieve a specific political goal. Kiras (2009) adds to this idea and states that they gain support and mobilization from a large part of the population. Their goal is generally to overthrow a political system, in other words, to "directly challenge the political authority (Unal, 2016, p. 28)". However, Unal (2016) continues to define Insurgency as "a violent struggle between the ruling state with a regular army and an opposing non-state actor with no regular army (Unal, 2016, p. 27)".

Insurgency actors usually use guerilla warfare to reach a specific goal. The term "guerilla" is often associated with more minor wars. According to Unal (2016), it is a way for armed non-state resistance to employ their tactics over a ruling government. The main aim of guerilla fighters is to create a revolutionary movement by mobilizing the peasantry from urban and rural areas. It is common for groups who embrace Marxist Theory to use guerilla techniques as a mode of warfare (Unal, 2016). Resulting in communist ideology being largely spread in guerilla groups. Commonly, many guerilla fighters wish to bring Marxist revolution to unindustrialized countries (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). A direct strategy of insurgencies is to use violence "within the context of direct, armed struggle in asymmetric modes of warfare for political claim-making (Unal, 2016, p. 27)". Guerillas often gain their finance through non-conventional methods, such as extortion, kidnappings for ransom, and theft (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

Paramilitary forces are often a reaction to insurgencies and guerillas. According to Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance, "organized forces with military capability and modeled upon a military format, but which do not belong to the official, legitimate domain of the state's security forces of the state (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, n.d.)."

Internal Conflict:
The critical idea differentiating external conflicts from so-called internal conflicts is that the conflict occurs within the state instead of between states. An internal violent conflict is defined as a violent conflict within a state (Frere & Wilen, 2015). Jackson (2001) defines internal conflicts as conflicts that have their origin within the domestic sphere, located in structures of weak states, often involving a type of politically motivated violence. He argues that internal conflicts threaten international peace and security since the fighting can spill over to adjoining states in the region. Jackson (2001) also argues that the flow of refugees can upset regional stability consequently. However, one can argue that the

violence that occurs through internal conflicts has larger consequences in the country it occurs than externally.

2.1.3 Analyzing a conflict.

According to Herbert (2017), when understanding how to analyze a conflict. It is vital to have a structured process focusing on the conflict profile. The actors involved, their perspectives, the structural and proximate causes, and the dynamics of these elements' interactions (Herbert, 2017). Herbert (2017) continues to argue that when analyzing a conflict, it is customary to analyze a conflict at different levels, interpersonal, group/community, and national. Taking their relationship and levels of interaction with each other into consideration (Herbert, 2017).

A conflict often occurs in a cyclical process, and a conflict cycle is described by Robinson (1978) as "the stages that most community conflicts go through." Meaning the steps people who live in a particular conflict must go through to eventually solve the conflict at the end (PennState College of Agricultural Science, n.d.). Robinson (1978) describes these stages as being: tension development, role dilemma, injustice collecting, confrontation, and lastly, adjustments. In comparison, according to an article by Brahm (2003), the project for Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP) defines five additional phases of conflict. These phases are described as an impending crisis, outbreak of violence, war, post-crisis, and stable peace. Brahm (2003) argues that conflicts do not have a linear path, which helps give conflicts a sense of intractability. According to Krisenberg (2003), intractability includes a magnitude of different definitions; however, she argues that intractability refers to something that is persisting for a long time. Brahm's understanding of conflict cycles will be considered in this paper.

2.2 Consequences of violence towards state building

Violent conflicts can have adverse effects on state and state building. According to Kurtenbach (2011) is the conceptualization of state-building, the process that aims to

establish political order, and the establishment of formal institutions and bureaucracies. He argues that the state is shaped by two elements in particular, image and practice. The way one sees the state as well as what the state practices. Adding to the definition of state-building, the OECD DAC Initial Finding Paper defines state-building as "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations (OECD, 2011, p. 20)". The OECD argues that state-building is particularly challenging when it takes place in conflict-affected and post-conflict environments (OECD, 2011). The spillover effect of violence and armed conflicts can create tension, uncertainty, and state problems (OECD, 2011). This notion highlights the importance of peacebuilding in conflict-prone states. Peacebuilding focuses on transitioning from conflict to peace (OECD, 2011).

It is evident that if there is conflict in a country, democracy can be at risk. A fragile state is a weak state. Weak states have minimal capacity to carry out essential functions related to governing their population and territory (OECD, 2011). Consequently, this makes the citizens and the state weak and dysfunctional. Weak states are also more prone to suffer when met with challenges like natural disasters, regional or international economic crises, and even shocks that come with climate change (OECD, 2011).

2.3 Transitional justice

The UN Secretary-General promotes the idea that "justice, peace, and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives (United Nations Security Council, 2004". Meaning if one wishes to have peace and democracy in a post-conflict state, then linking these factors will be unavoidable. The process of transitional justice, according to OHCHR, aims to provide recognition for victims, strengthen the trust in state institutions for individuals, and reinforce the idea of respect for the rule of law and human rights as a step toward the prevention of new violations and reconciliation (OHCHR, n.d.). Transitional justice is a response to methodical or prevalent violations of human rights (PYN, 2019). According to Political Youth Network (2019),

transitional justice arises in two sets of patterns: in the context of armed conflicts as a matter of post-conflict justice or to deal with the abuses conflicted by past dictatorships or authoritarian regimes (PYN, 2019).

The process of transitional justice covers an extensive range of functions and mechanisms associated with the attempt made by societies to come to terms with the effects of past large-scale conflict to ensure justice, accountability, and reconciliation (OHCHR, n.d.). The term includes the effects caused by repression, violations, and abuses. Reconciliation means to make people or groups of opposite beliefs, ideas, or situations agree (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). Including the idea that two or more people or groups become friendly again after a fight or disagreement (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). According to UN Peace Building (2008), transitional justice is a long-term goal to end impunity and establish democratic governance through the rule of law. This is to help fill the democratic hole left behind in post-conflict societies. The concept of transitional justice stems from the late 1980s and early 1990s. It originated as a response to political transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America (UN Peace Building, 2008). The UN states that moral, legal, and political dilemmas are all concepts included in the transitional justice context. A transitional justice process is often embedded in peace negotiations (Elster, 2021, p. 45). Some of the most powerful and important transitional justice mechanisms are criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, institutional reform, and memorialization (PYN, 2019).

2.4 International mediation
2.4.1 Definition
Mediation is defined by the United Nations in the Guidance for Effective Mediation Framework (2012) as the "voluntary process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation Framework, 2012)". Touval and Zartman (2006) add on to this definition that "mediation

today is defined as a process in which a third party helps conflicting sides to find a solution to their conflicts that they cannot find themselves (Vukovic, 2015)". Furthermore, the UN Charter identifies mediation as "an important means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict." Vukovic (2015) defines mediation as the most suitable tactic for third-party conflict management. Mediation can be seen as a peacebuilding tactic where peacebuilding is undertaken when violent conflicts are happening, prone to occur, or recently over (OECD, 2011).

The UN describes the process of mediation as a process that is used throughout the whole of a conflict cycle. To ensure, address, and work towards resolving a conflict in a non-violent and constructive manner. Mediation is seen as one of the most effective methods in conflict resolution to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The mediation process is a voluntary endeavor where it is essential to have the consent of all parties (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012). The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012) stresses the importance that the antagonists of the mediation process need to be persuaded of the merits of the mediation. Pointing out that an eventual peace process needs to be well-supported politically, technically, and financially (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012). Focusing on the peaceful means of resolution. Vukovic (2015) argues that international mediators' involvement in conflicts has become increasingly pivotal. He argues this has become vital when changing different parties' perceptions and preferences. Vukovic (2015) continues to argue that mediators are crucial when the terms of agreements seem unthinkable to the parties when it comes to facilitating communication and formulating solutions.

Peace mediation combines all levels of the structured process of mediation, from the initial contact between mediators and conflict parties to the eventual ceasefire negotiations that can lead to the implementation of a peace agreement (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012). The term peace mediation covers a range of instruments that are used in the process of dealing with intra- and interstate conflicts. These include

frameworks such as the mediation process, mediation support, and mediation-based dialogue (Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, 2017).

According to Duursma (2014), mediation is crucial and central in modern-day conflict resolution. Duursma (2014), among others (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006 and Frazier & Dixon, 2006), states that statistics prove that mediation has occurred in 70 percent of all conflicts since 1945. This results in the probability that peace agreements are six times more likely to conclude when third-party mediators are involved.

2.4.2 Actors: individuals, states, regional and international organizations

According to a study by Bercovitch & Gartner (2006), any actor can undertake mediation if they have resources, standing, or interest. It is common to categorize mediators into four substantial categories: individuals, states, regional, and international organizations. There will be a larger focus on mediation efforts through states and international organizations in this paper. According to Whitfield (2010), mediators are external actors, understood as those foreign to the conflict theater and who play a crucial role in the course and conclusion of peace agreements in conflicts. A conflict theater is defined as the place the violent acts take place. Vukovic (2015) argues that contemporary scholars define the process of conflict management through mediation by more than one third-party actor as multiparty mediation.

Individuals

It is common for individuals to engage in mediation, but when they engage in such acts, they often represent their governments. Due to the nature of this, are these individuals categorized as a state rather than individuals. Therefore, will the appropriate definition of individuals who engage in mediation is people with no governmental ties or political incumbents (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006).

States

States, through their representatives, are one of the most common mediation actors. When a state is a mediator, is it common for one of its top decision-makers or current or former leaders to engage in this process. However, this is not the case in all countries, often state representative members of the Foreign Ministry or other diplomatic instances. In the past, important figures with state mediator roles are Henry Kissinger, Bill Clinton, and Great Britain's Lord Carrington (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Bercovitch & Gartner (2006) argue that it is crucial for these actors to be seen as impartial and participate voluntarily to have an effective mediation process. Where any "unwelcome intervention may be strenuously resisted and indeed violates article 2 of the UN Charter (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006)".

International organizations (IO) and regional organizations

The work of international organizations defined in this paper as IOs and regional organizations are vital in mediation, where the UN is the most active IO in mediation today. IOs are seen as an actor that can achieve peace and resolve conflicts independently. Making them key actors and essential mediators. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) argue that IOs have considerable resources making them crucial actors. Regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) or African Union (AU) also have great latitude in mediation. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) argue that since most conflict happens between regional neighbors are, regional organizations prime actors. When regional organizations engage in mediation, their strengths are often built on the idea of common backgrounds, cultures, and experiences (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). However, the main difference between IOs and regional organizations is that regional organizations lack the same capacity or resources of that as IOs. On the other hand, IOs are also built on the same strengths as regional organizations and have great power when it comes to building on ideas of shared culture and values. This is mainly because IOs comprise state representatives from many different countries.

2.4.3 The mediation process

For a mediation process to happen, certain conditions need to be met. Conditions such as confidentially, partiality, and having the right motivation. According to Duursma (2014), mediation is a consensual process; all parties involved need to be in a shared understanding for it to occur. Furthermore, both the conflict parties' motives as well as the mediators' motives need to be in line. Beardsley (2011) recognizes that if the parties are motivated to accept mediation, then a common motivation of mutual desire to conclude a shared peace agreement is in place (Duursma, 2014). Mediation can also be used in intrastate conflicts for rebel parties to gain recognition, or other actors might use mediation as a stalling tactic. However, these ideas are well-disputed (Duursma, 2014). According to the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012), mediation should exist alongside facilitation, good offices, and dialogue efforts.

Duursma (2014) explores the idea that mediators are not merely bystanders but actively participate in conflict resolution. This leads the process to take many forms. As stated above, it is crucial that mediation is met by consent from all parties and that a mediator is impartial and inclusive.

2.4.4 Outcomes of international mediation

Regarding international mediation, it is evident in Duursma's (2014) work and various other scholars discuss that mediation can provide excellent results in conflict-prone states. There are several outcomes of mediation. However, the focus of this paper will limit itself to discussing outcomes such as "peace agreements and lasting peace."

Peace agreement and lasting peace:

A long-term effect of mediation can be lasting peace; however, this is not an implicit consequence. Many mediation processes fail; however, many processes succeed. As Duursma (2014) states above, "mediation has occurred in 70 percent of all conflicts since 1945, and the probability of a peace agreement being concluded is six times more likely when intermediaries are present (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009; Frazier & Dixon, 2006)".

The most common outcome of mediation today is the promise to sign a peace agreement. The challenges then lie in the agreement's implementation and if the peace agreement manages to stand on its own. However, according to Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015), several peace processes remain unstable regardless of the positive trend of peace agreements reached. Peace agreement manages to stand on its own.

2.5 Peace process

In brief, a peace process involves a step of negotiation to end wars and promote and build sustainable peace (United States Institute of Peace, n.d.). This paper will use the concept of the Final Agreement and peace process synonymously. According to Pinckney (2020), the peace process focuses on brokering deals with and between armed actors. According to the Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012), "peace agreements should end violence and provide a platform to achieve sustainable peace, justice, security, and reconciliation." The same paper promotes the idea that to determine the viability of a peace agreement, should the characteristics of the process and the content of the accord be appropriately selected. According to Bell (2015), there is no formal official definition of peace agreements or peace process; however, she tries to define peace process as "an attempt to bring political and military elites involved in a conflict, to some sort of mutual agreement as to how to end the conflict."

Some peace processes are the central issue in protecting the victims' rights. However, implementing peace agreements often depends on external support (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012). The UN states that "to achieve a quality peace agreement, attention must be paid during the negotiations and implementation to the process, substance and institutionalization of mechanisms that provide for the nonviolent resolution of the conflict…". It means that all actors in a peace process must focus on the task at hand.

2.5.1 Reintegration rural reform (RRI)

The RRI is a framework provided in the Final Agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC that aims to transform the rural areas in Colombia. It seeks to build the foundation to transform the rural area and create conditions to ensure the well-being and health of the Colombian people (Government of Colombia, 2016). Furthermore, it focuses on achieving sustainable peace and reforming rural areas.

2.5.2 Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)

The DDR approach is a process that "lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities to which these individuals return while building capacity for long-term peace, security, and development (United Nations, 2017)". It focuses on ex-combatants and the process of removing their weapons. According to the United Nations Peacekeeping (United Nations, 2017), the process seeks to "support ex-combatants and those associated with armed groups so that they can become active participants in the peace process."

2.5.3 Monitoring and verification mechanism (MVM)

The MVM was created to facilitate and guarantee the surrender of arms, and end of hostilities through a bilateral case-fire (Calderon et al., 2017). The MVM consists of three levels, local, regional, and national. One national, eight regional and many local monitoring teams are put in place to oversee the process (Calderon et al., 2017). There are 23 protocols set out through the MVM mission that allows for the ceasefire to be put in place. This includes information about time, actions prohibited, and more.

3. NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA
3.1 Introduction

The internal conflict in Colombia is long and complex, with roots in violence between guerilla fighters, paramilitary forces, and the Government. Several failed peace negotiations have taken place, and killings and violence have been a dominant part of everyday life. Colombia's cycle of violence has been hard to break. However, a Final

Agreement was signed in 2016 and was said to be a means to end the violence between FARC and the Colombian Government. The peace and implementation processes wouldn't be where it is today if not due to the extensive international political support and financial and practical aid. Arguably one could say that Colombia would not be where they are today without the support, they have received through the Security Council-UN verification missions. Notwithstanding the support, they received when the deal was in the making. However, it is essential to state that violence between other guerilla groups is still a present factor in the country today.

As of today, one can argue that Colombia is dependent on both bilateral and international support if they wish to see an independent, non-violent future. They have a long history of failed negotiations, leading one to believe that international society is a vital actor. Especially when it comes to the implementation process and the maintenance of the peace deal. However, it is important to recognize and not neglect that the most crucial factor for lasting peace in Colombia is that the Colombians can agree among themselves.

3.2 History of the conflict leading up to the peace agreement

The Colombians have experienced one of the world's most protracted and violent conflicts. However still managed to upkeep a stable democratic political system, working economy, and sophisticated legal regime (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The internal armed conflict in Colombia has had several consequences in the rural and remote areas of the country. The more urban areas have not suffered as much. According to Beittel (2015), it been due to Colombia's lack of a strong central government that resulted in violent insurgencies taking form. Allowing groups to form guerilla factions challenging the state (Beittel, 2015). Scholars argue that the conflict in Colombia has roots all the way back to its independence from Spain in the early 1800s (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). Many scholars argue that it is due to the extended history of civil strife between 1812 and 1902 that violence has become an embedded factor in the country. During this period, Colombia experienced ten national civil wars.

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3.2.1 Background on the complex conflict

What gained the name "the Colombian Conflict" started on May 27, 1964. When the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC, was created. The creation of FARC caused a ripple effect, and other guerilla groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) were created subsequently. The guerilla groups extorted local landowners and raided cattle ranches. Many guerilla groups were created as fighters for rural struggles, where ideas of discontent against the regime had risen amongst them. Fabra-Zamora et al. (2021) argue that Colombia's conflict started as a proxy of the Cold War. The guerilla groups opposed the weak state in Colombia and received support from the Soviet Union and China, with promises of Communist reform. Whereas the local Colombian Government received assistance from the United States as a response in hopes of stopping the communist blowout.

In 1974, the M-19 (April 19 movement) was founded. They grew as a reaction to the elections of Misael Pastrana Borrero as the president of the *Frente Nacional*. His elections were said to be allegedly fraudulent (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). *Frente Nacional* was a bipartisan coalition government that lasted for four terms (Justice for Colombia, n.d.).

In the period from the 1970s, drug trafficking became a new factor that increased violence and fueled the conflict. Marijuana and cocaine were two of the leading substances on the market (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The strength of the guerilla actors grew, and the state's inability to protect its people in the rural areas became weaker. Paramilitary forces were created consequently to try to fight the guerilla groups. "Paramilitaries sought to crush guerillas by murder and intimidation, both their combatants and anybody whom they deemed as supporters, such as left-wing politicians… (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021, p. 5)". They were created by cooperation who founded, trained, and armed groups for self-protection, as well as aided cattle ranchers and landowners (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). However, by 1997 most of the paramilitary forces unified into the United Self-

defense of Colombia (AUC, *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*), which funded itself through drug production. These AUCs had strong ties with economic and political elites, allowing them to gain significant power in Colombia's formal political institutions (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

<u>Period of negotiation and violence</u>

To find a solution to the long and violent conflict, several failed negotiations and peace processes have taken place between the Colombian Government and the guerilla groups.

Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-78) was the first president after the *Frente Nacional*. He was a liberal and attempted and failed at negotiations with FARC. In 1978-82, fellow liberal Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala implemented a robust security policy towards the guerillas during a constate "state of siege" (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The "state of siege" allowed "ample power to military forces to suppress human rights (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021 p. 6)". It is argued amongst scholars that his policies led to several violations of human rights and the intensity of the conflict increased as a response. Conservative Belisario Betancur became president from 1982-86 with aspirations of peace. He started a negotiation with the FARC and arranged a truce with M-19. As a result of the negotiations with FARC, a new political party was created, the Patriotic Union (UP). The party was designed to allow space for guerillas and other excluded, unarmed political social actors (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The party gained 14 seats in Congress as well as won many elected offices. However, many UP members were systematically killed in the 1980s. Somewhere around 2000-3000 were reported murdered, including their 1986 and 1990 presidential candidate (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). These systematic killings led to the truce between M19 ending and FARC withdrawing from politics. It subsequently led to a series of future assaults between guerillas and military forces. Consequently, half of the Supreme Court Justices died in the crossfire in 1985 (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

The end of the 1980s became extremely violent, and FARC and the ELN were excluded from the constitutional process. The constitutional process was a process that led to the writing of the Constitution of 1991. It also radically transformed the state's structure, enriched social rights, created mechanisms for judicial rights, and enforced democratic and pluralist principles. It also delegitimized the use of violence for political purposes and eliminated the 1986 "state of siege" (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). There were new attempts between the Liberal Cesar Gavirias (1990-94) government and FARC in Mexico in 1992. However, these attempts also failed.

Liberal Ernesto Samper (1994-98) and Conservative Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) were unsuccessful in negotiating with the guerillas. During the negotiations with Pastrana, FARC was granted a large, demilitarized zone (about 42000 square miles). A place designated for negotiations to take place. However, this place was used by FARC to "regroup, re-arm, and rebuild its forces (Beittel, 2015 p. 3)". Resulting in FARC using it as a "safe haven" instead of negotiation grounds. Subsequently going against the formal purposes of the demilitarization zone. Subsequently, the negotiations failed when Pastrana retook control over the territory.

Pastrana enforced the so-called "Plan Colombia" strategy that same year. A plan involving 7.5 USD billion to "end the conflict and drug trafficking, with significant financial and logistical support from the United States (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021 p. 7)". This caused a strong disillusion towards FARC, and in 2002 Conservative Alvaro Uribe was elected on the promise to go hard out against guerillas. Uribe served two terms (2002-10) which he advanced the "democratic security" policy, which focused on "strengthening armed forces and created networks of collaborators and monetary rewards to attack guerillas, particularly high-ranking leaders (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021 p. 7)". The policy was successful on many terms, it caused FARC to retreat from some urban regions, diminish their size and reduce some of their actions. However, "democratic security" has been criticized for promoting systematic violations of human rights, murder of

noncombatant citizens, and failing to address the social and economic aspects of the conflict (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021 p. 7). Uribe managed to amend the 1991 Constitution to permit his re-election as well as promote the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975 of 2005). "A procedure for the prosecution and trial of members of illegal groups and to provide some measures in favor of victims (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021)". Uribe's new and offensive plan of attack against the guerilla forces received the name *Plan Patriota* (Patriotic Plan). It reduced FARC ranks, allowed people to regain the land, and led to confiscating of large amounts of equipment for making cocaine (Beittel, 2015).

3.2.2 Way towards a peace process

Despite the failed attempts at negotiation peace stated above. The process of acquiring the 2016 peace deal that led to the final agreement can roughly be explained in three distinct phases. Secret preparatory talks (2010-11), Secret exploratory talks (2012), and formal public negotiations (2012-2016).

Secret preparatory talks 2010-11

Venezuela managed to facilitate a direct meeting between an envoy from FARC and the Government in early 2011. The secret talks started after President Santos's election in August 2011 (Nylander et al., 2018). At this part of the negotiations, FARC and the Government decided to bring in Cuba and Norway as guarantor states.

In November 2011, governmental forces killed FARCs leader Alfonso Cano. However, much to everyone's surprise, the negotiations were not stopped (Nylander et al., 2018). This incident marked the decision to "not let incidents on the ground interfere with the talks (Nylander et al., 2018)". FARC, however, from 2011-12 peak in rebel attacks towards infrastructure sectors, such as oil pipelines, trains carrying coal, and electrical towers. Some observers argue that FARC escalated their attacks to have more leverage within the peace talks (Beittel, 2015).

Secret exploratory talks 2012

The parties were ready to start the secret exploratory talks in Havana in February 2012. Ten negotiation rounds were held in Havana from February to August 2012, each lasting four to eight days (Nylander et al., 2018). This resulted in a mutual signature of the agenda for the talks on August 27th, 2012.

Formal public negotiations 2012-16

In August of 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-14) announced to the public that secret exploratory talks with FARC had taken place in Havana. He announced that a negotiation plan was established and confirmed that it had been going on for one and a half years. Santos had already proposed a landmark Victim and Land Restitution to Law (Law 1448 of 2011), focusing on compensation for victims and restitution of land for forcefully displaced people.

Shortly after, in June 2012, Congress approved the Legal Framework for Peace (*Marco Juridico Para la Paz).* It was a crucial step in the right direction and a constitutional amendment providing transitional justice possibilities. The negotiation teams were established quickly after President Santo's announcement (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

The official peace talks started in Oslo, Norway, in October 2012. However, they were moved to Cuba just one month later, on the 19th of November (Nylander et al., 2018). During the negotiations, the UN purposefully kept out of the process (Brubaker, 2020). However, they were at one point called in to provide expert advice to one of the subcommittees working on transnational justice (Brubaker, 2020). Santos was reelected in 2014-18 with the promise of finishing the peace process (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

The Final Agreement

The negotiations, which were expected to take around four to eight months, ended up lasting for about four years and were only immobile once. The final agreement was

completed and announced to the public on the 24th of August 2016. It was signed by Santos and Rodrigo Lodoño Echeverri in Cartagena, Colombia, on September 26th, 2016 (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The agreement ratification was held on October 2nd, 2016, and on the 25th of November, everything was set in motion, and the Revised Final Agreement was signed.

3.3 How to classify the conflict in Colombia.

The armed conflict in Colombia can be defined as an internal violent asymmetric conflict. For the purpose of this paper, it will solely be referred to as an "internal conflict," notwithstanding the violent and asymmetric aspect. The armed violence in Colombia is clearly a conflict that is happening within the state where numerous actors are violently fighting each other. According to Colombia's National Center for Historical Memory, 261,619 people died, and 80,472 people disappeared during the 60 years of conflict from 1958-2018 (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021, p. 5).

The conflict in Colombia has escalated due to the severe intensity of the armed groups opposing the Government. In many ways, has been a conflict between rural and urban areas, between rich and poor, and between the intellectual elite with support from communities against the traditional power elite structure. The violence has led to a humanitarian crisis in the country. According to Beittel (2015), five decades of fighting have taken a huge hit on Colombia. According to figures from the Colombian Government, have more than 5 million people have been displaced, which is larger than 10% of Colombia's population (Beittel, 2015). In rough numbers, the conflict has claimed tens of thousands of lives, and more than 25000 people are registered as missing or disappeared (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). Since 1990 there have been more than 10000 deaths and injuries due to the use of landmines placed by mainly FARC (Beittel, 2015). Between 1970 and 2010, Colombia's National Center for Historical Memory estimated that guerilla groups kidnapped more than twenty-five thousand people (Klobucista & Renwick, 2017).

3.4 Actors

There are several actors that play an important role in the internal conflict in Colombia. Some of the actors range from local actors, and some of the actors are international and external actors. According to Bell et al. (2015) are, the main protagonists in the internal conflict the Government and pro-state (right-wing) paramilitary forces on one side, and on the other side, left-wing guerilla forces such as FARC, ELN, and M19.

The actors that will be examined in this section will be the actors that had a substantial role in what led to as well as the aftermath of the 2016 peace process.

3.4.1 Guerilla groups

While the peace process of 2016 was only successful in coming to an agreement between FARC and the Colombian Government, it is important to briefly mention who the ELN and M19 are. However, it is essential to state that little attention will be paid to ELN and M19 throughout the paper. The ELN arose as a guerilla group through university students and Catholic radicals who endorsed and valued Liberal Theology. They hoped to replicate the Fidel Castro 1959 communist revolution that previously had taken place in Cuba (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021)[2]. As stated above, M19 was founded as a response to allegedly fraudulent elections taking place in 1970. The two are both defined as guerilla groups that have caused a lot of violence in Colombia. The ELN is still operative, whereas the M19 was demobilized in the late 1980s (Grabe, 2012).

FARC is one of Colombia's largest guerilla groups and has roots all the way back to the peasant movements from 1940s and 1950s (Beittel, 2015). At the time of the signature was Roberto Lodoño, also known as Timoléon Jiménez, commander in chief, leading

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[2] It is worth mentioning that the new President Gustavo Petro has taken the initiative to start up the negotiations with ELN under his program *Paz Total* (Total Peace) (McColl, 2022).

FARC (Serafini, 2022). He was the representative from FARC who signed the peace agreement.

FARC was formally established in 1964 with the intent to overthrow the perceived social inequality that was taking place in Colombia. The origin of FARC lies in Marxist-Leninist ideology leading to peasants and former liberal guerilla fighters coming together to create an armed resistance. FARC has roots in the rural struggles in Colombia and opposed the privatization of natural resources (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). FARC operated mainly in Colombia's northeastern and southern areas, and some members resided in Venezuela. FARC was initially based in the mountainous region between Cali and Bogota (Beittel, 2015). According to Cook (2011), FARC transformed from a traditional guerilla group into a full-on insurgency due to their ability to convert proceedings from illicit narcotics into funding used for operational purposes.

FARC is known for conducting armed assaults, extortion, hostage-taking, and assassinations (National Counterterrorism Center FTOs, 2022). They used tactics like these as a source of leverage and income (Klobucista & Renwick, 2017). The group's main targets were the Colombian Government and military. FARC also attacked critical infrastructure, at times US military personnel, and the Colombian civilian population. They were equipped with arms, mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and machine guns (National Counterterrorism Center FTOs, 2022). When FARC moved into the drug trade, were they able to take control over production territory and trafficking of the drugs. This allowed them to expand their financial capabilities and challenge the Government's authority (Cook, 2011). FARC began to collect taxes from marijuana and coca growers (Beittel, 2015), and in the early 2000s, FARC was known to control 60% of Colombia's cocaine trafficking.

FARC had its peak in the early 2000s, with an estimated 16000 – 20000 fighters (Beittel, 2015). FARC conducted numerous high-profile abductions and killings around this time.

Whereas, in 2002 FARC abducted presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and kept her along with three US military contractors for 6 years until their release in 2008. FARC also assassinated the former culture minister in 2001 and hijacked a domestic, commercial flight in 2002 (Klobucista & Renwick, 2017).

3.4.2 The Colombian Government

The Colombian Government has largely been represented by the Colombian army and police through the years of conflict (Justice for Colombia, n.d.). Through many years of conflict, has Colombian policies and the justice system been threatened by guerilla groups. Between 1998 and 2002, the Colombian armed forces have grown by 60% (Justice for Colombia, n.d.) due to escalations in violence between the government and guerilla groups. The Government has undergone several reforms to change its military command and control structures, increase training, and upgrade its equipment (Beittel, 2015). President Juan Manuel Santos sat in office from 2010 until 2018 and was one of Colombia's most influential governmental actors in the years of the negotiation process. He was the one from the government side who signed the Final Agreement when it was concluded.

3.4.3 United Nations

The United Nations is an international organization and has been one of the leading actors in the verification of the implementation process of the peace agreement in Colombia. The security council is a UN body consisting of 15 members, where five of these are permanent members. The ten remaining members have an active role in the council and are rotating on a two-year basis. The General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General have had an immense role in the implementation of the Final Agreement as well. According to the United Nations (n.d.-b) is, the secretary-general the chief administrative officer … who shall act in that capacity and perform "such other functions as are entrusted" to them by the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and other United Nations organs (United Nations, n.d.-a)."

3.4.4 Guarantor States

Norway and Cuba received the role of guarantor states in the preparatory and subsequent exploratory phases. They received the role since both countries previously engaged in efforts to bring peace to the country (Nylander et al., 2018). Their role was essentially to be neutral and facilitate the efforts around the process. Subsequently, it is important to mention that Venezuela also had a fundamental role in the entire process.

3.5 Norway and Cuba's involvement

As mentioned above, Norway and Cuba were guarantor countries. They received the task to help facilitate the peace process, get the parties involved, and organize space for talks. In other words, were they tasked with mediating the peace process's preparatory and subsequent exploratory phases.

Norway and Cuba's involvement in the secret preparatory talks (2010-11), secret exploratory talks (2012), and formal public negotiations (2012-2016) will be evaluated below. For the purpose of this paper will, the evaluation of their participation be kept to a minimum since the research focus is more on the post-agreement phase.

Secret preparatory talks

In the secret preparatory talks, the parties decided to ask the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist in the logistics of transporting FARC to Cuba, where the talks would take place (Nylander et al., 2018). According to a report from the Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), the decision to use the ICRC as transport intermediaries was a difficult decision. This was due to previous distrust of the FARC, where the Colombian Government had "duped the FARC in an operation involving a helicopter marked with falsified ICRC logos (Nylander et al., 2018, p. 2)". However, when FARC agreed to use ICRC, it reaffirmed their motivation and indicated the level of trust the actors needed towards each other. It consequently showed that FARC, the guarantor

countries, and the Colombian Government needed to trust each other if they had any hopes of the peace process succeeding.

During these talks, the parties, as mentioned above, decided early on that whatever happened on the ground should not interfere with the negotiations (Nylander et al., 2018). A crucial factor was that no cease-fire agreement was to be signed prior to the peace agreement.

Secret exploratory talks

The secret exploratory talks began in February 2012, and confidentiality became a key principle between the parties (Nylander et al., 2018). The Government of Cuba housed the two parties and the Norwegian diplomats in a gated community called "*El Laguito"* (small lake). The negotiation plan was to take place in the morning and sometimes in the afternoon in one of the houses in the gated community (Nylander et al., 2018). The idea was that all parties lived in the gated community, with close walking proximity. Allowing the parties to have informal access to each other if they wished to meet outside scheduled meeting hours (Nylander et al., 2018). The Norwegian delegation was placed in *Casa 23,* also called "Norwegian House", and this space was used to conduct informal and immediate exchanges.

After the ten negotiation rounds that were held in Havana, the plan was that the Colombian governmental delegation and the Norwegian diplomats would return to their respective cities, Bogota and Oslo (Nylander et al., 2018). Whereas FARC would stay in *El Laguito* for the remaining five years of the process. By August were, the parties ready to sign the agenda for talks. It was an agenda that, according to Nylander et al. (2018), addressed six items. It was short, focused, and realistic.

It is worth mentioning the fact that since the parties managed to keep this phase secret, it allowed them to agree to the short and focused agenda. It was crucial in this phase that

the parties were allowed to live in proximity and communicate with each other whenever it was deemed necessary. It is said that the goal of the talks was "to end the conflict in order to contribute to the establishment of stable and lasting peace (Nylander et al., 2018)". Another crucial outcome of this agreement was the "five-point agenda". It included "a timetable and a road map for the next steps, including establishing mechanisms for the implementation and verification of agreements (Nylander et al., 2018 p.3)".

Formal public negotiations

Following the formal public negotiations were mechanisms for structure and discipline put in place. The formal launch was set to happen in Oslo, and then they moved to Havana a few months later. The negotiations were set to be conducted in Havana until the Agreements were closed (Nylander et al., 2018). Having the talks outside of Colombia emphasized the idea that the process had international support. FARC, at this time, was on the US and European Union (EU) terror list. According to Nylander et al. (2018), bringing FARC to Norway emphasized the importance and commitment of the international community for the peace process. Looking past the idea that they were labeled terrorists and taking the risking bringing them to Oslo[3].

3.5.1 Evaluations

It is evident that international aid was a large part of how the Final Agreement came to be. It shows that the guarantor counties, ICRC, and more played a crucial role in the shaping of the agreement. Without their support, one can speculate that the parties involved would never trust each other as they did. The Final Agreement arguably would never have been as detailed, comprehensive, and clear as it ended up being if it was not for the international actors involved. It is also clear that the help of these international actors has it casted a light on the situation in Colombia and strengthened the awareness that the country needed assistance.

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[3] For more information about Norway and Cuba's contribution (Nylander et al., 2018).

4. EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE CONFLICT

As described above, it has been vital to understanding how the peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian Government came to be able to answer the research question. The research question is: *to what extent has it been important to receive support from the UN and the UN security council, to facilitate the verification of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement?* The continuation of the paper below will describe some key elements of the agreement, the implementation process, and the role of the Security Council.

4.1 The Final Agreement

The comprehensive Final Agreement consists of almost 300 pages and is composed of six chapters. Each chapter corresponds with one of the six negotiation points that were agreed to in and during the formal public negotiations (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). The Final Agreement received the name "Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace". In short, the peace agreement aims to put an end to the violence between FARC. Furthermore, it aims to create organized disarmament camps for former FARC soldiers to lay down their weapons. The agreement provides a framework ensuring justice for victims of the conflict and rural development and aims to put an end to the drug war. The peace process also laid down the framework to ensure seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives for former FARC members.

As stated, is the Final Agreement divided into 6 chapters[4]. To be able to answer the research question later, it will be vital to get an overview and brief understanding of what these chapters are about.

Chapter 1 of the Agreement contains information about "Comprehensive Rural Reform." It discusses the measures taken to "improve access, including a land fund, acquisition

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[4] To read the detailed version of the *Final Agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace*: (Final agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace, 2016).

subsidies, and credits, and a plan for land property formalization (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021)". Furthermore, it contains information regarding national plans to invest in infrastructure, public goods and services, development, the right to food, and economic stimulus (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

Chapter 2 of the Agreement contains information about "Political Participation: a democratic opportunity to build peace." The aim of the measure is to promote new voices in the political system. As well as make space for social movements and peaceful protest and focus on democratic participation (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

Chapter 3 of the Agreement contains information about the "Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying down of Arms." Chapter 3 focuses on the definitive end to violence between the parties. It emphasizes that FARC will transform into a legal party after the disarmament and that they would have a minimum of five seats in each house of Congress for two consecutive periods (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

Chapter 4 of the Agreement contains information about the "Solution to the Illicit Drug Problem." This section focuses on the transition from illegal to legal crops. Developing a National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS). Furthermore, there agreed on a set of comprehensive policies against the production and commercialization of drugs (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021).

Chapter 5 of the Agreement contains information about "victims" and mechanisms set in place to promote jurisdiction for peace. With the aim of creating institutions that seek to "investigate, judge, and punish serious human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in armed conflicts (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021)". Chapter 5 fundamentally addresses the aspect of transitional justice. Furthermore, is the promoting

of Truth Commissions, reparative measures, and units for Persons Presumed Disappeared included.

Chapter 6 of the Agreement contains information about the "Implementation and verification mechanism." The last chapter discusses the ratification, implementation, and verification mechanism set in place and sets forth the criteria for the 10-year framework plan (Fabra-Zamora et al., 2021). Section 6.3 of the Final Agreement "specifies that a UN mission should be responsible for the verification of the reintegration of FARC members into political, economic and social life; the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures; and comprehensive security and protection programs for communities and organizations in the territories (UN Verification Mission in Colombia. (n.d.)".[5]

4.2 The implementation process

According to Amaya-Panche (2021) the implementation of the peace agreement has faced an assortment of challenges. She argues that one of the main challenges lies in the Government's commitment to preserve the original agreement. Furthermore, does she claim that there has been a challenge when getting the Government to include all stakeholders. Especially at the local level and ensures the implementation of state policy is correlated with the final agreement.

The implementation process received a 15-year target when the Final Agreement was first implemented[6]. However, according to section 6.1 Implementation and verification Mechanism of the Final Agreement, can the "initial period of operation … after which the member of the Commission will decide on its extension (Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016, p. 207). It also states that a

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[5] See p. 225 in The Final Agreement for further information about UNs role.
[6] See p. 207 in The Final Agreement for further information about the implementation.

"Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement", will be established after the mutual signature of the Final Agreement.

International actors have played an important role in monitoring and mediation between the victims and demobilized population, FARC, and the Government (Amaya-Panche, 2021). Amaya-Panche (2021) further states that between 2018 and 19, only 6% of the goals and objectives of the peace agreement were accomplished. A crucial part of the implementation process was the inclusion of citizens. Making them participate in the implementation process of every point (Caro, 2021).

4.3 United Nations and Security Council's implementation work

To understand the importance of the work that the UN security council has done in Colombia, it is vital to understand their current role in the conflict. The UN has been present showing support for the parties involved in the conflict in Colombia for several decades. They have been active and present through agencies, funding, and programs providing aid (Garcia, 2017).

4.3.1 The post-agreement implementation phase 2016

In the context of the post-agreement phase in Colombia the UN was tasked with two special roles, disarmament, and a verification mission. The implementation process subsequently has two fundamental stages. First, to verify the disarmament of FARC soldiers' weapons and verify the ceasefire and bilateral and final hostilities between the parties. This initial mission was requested for a period of 12 months, with the possibility to be extended. The second mission focuses on the economic, social, and political reintegration verification process, security guarantees for former ex-combatants, and aid for the most affected communities (United Nations, n.d.). It specifies that the verification mission should verify the implementation of sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, n.d.).

FARC and the Colombian Government requested the initial UN mission because of the Final Agreement negotiations. The Colombian Government and FARC issued a joint communique asking the Security Council to establish a political mission to help facilitate the implementation of the Final Agreement (S/2016/53)[7]. According to *What's in Blue*[8,] the "Joint Communiqué asks the mission to settle disputes between the parties on the basis of its role as the international component of the tripartite mechanism (Security Council Reports, 2016a)".

This resulted in an unanimously adopted Resolution 2261[9,] also referred to as (S/RES/2261), which established a political monitoring mission and a mission for a definitive ceasefire and the confirmation of disarmament of weapons (Garcia, 2017). The resolution was adopted on the 25th of January 2016 and gained the name "Mission in Colombia" (Brubaker, 2020). The UN mission in Colombia was implemented to be an operation different from any other UN peacekeeping and blue helmet mission. However, the verification mission was established to follow aspects of a previous political mission in Nepal in 2007 (Security Council Reports, 2016a).

According to a statement by the United Kingdom (UK) delegate in the meeting where they adopted resolution 2261, he states that "It isn't often that a country refers itself to the Council," … "Together we can ensure that the implementation of this resolution is swift and effective (United Nations, 2016)". Implying that it was a milestone achievement, Colombia themselves realized they would need more international aid to implement the deal. Many diplomats and experts argue that due to the mutual agreement, to go to the council and ask for assistance, illustrating their motivation to upkeep the peace and their motivations to implement the deal to its fullest potential. The mission's goal is to monitor it by a triparty mechanism made up of the UN, the Colombian Government, and the FARC.

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[7] For more information about the letter (S/2016/53) (United Nations Security Council, 2016a).
[8] What's in Blue is a publication by the independent and impartial organization Security Council Report (Security Council Report, n.d.).
[9] Resolution S/RES/2261 (2016) (United Nations Security Council, 2016b).

The UN mandate was later updated to include the reintegration and protection of ex-combats (Brubaker, 2020), and the disarmament mission was limited to ensuring the handover of weapons within 180 days (Garcia, 2017).

4.3.2 How the mandate works and security council procedure

The UN-SC verification mission came with certain conditions set forth by the parties involved. First, the parties involved required that the UN monitors be out of uniform, unarmed, and use people from countries in the region. Effectively resulting in the UN monitors being "made up of unarmed international observers and civilians, drawn almost entirely from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Garcia, 2017)". According to Brubaker (2020), the second condition was that the mission would not follow standard UN protocol. This was a wish from President Santos, who believed that the UN presence in Colombia would be brief. However, this has not been the case. Finally, the third condition, according to Brubaker (2020), is that "nothing is going to be in the mandate that we have not approved (Brubaker, 2020)". President Santos made it clear that Colombia would not agree to any mandate if it were not entirely on their terms (Brubaker, 2020). Santos subsequently decided that the UK would become the Penholder. After these conditions were met, resolution 2261 was formally adopted into use.

Resolution 2261 (2017) establishes the base of the UN verification mission in Colombia. According to the resolution, one of the criteria that the parties involved should "report to the Security Council on the implementation of the mission's mandate every 90 days after the start of its monitoring and verification activities and on completion of the mission (S/RES/2261(2016))". It ensures that the parties involved refer to the SC four times a year. Subsequently, ensure that they have four annual meetings where parties can come and express concerns or discuss potential developments. During each quarterly meeting, the special representative of the secretary-general and head of the UN verification

mission take part in the meetings. The current head is Carlos Ruiz Massieu (Security Council Reports, 2020). He briefs the council on developments and discusses the existing points in the secretary-general's latest 90-mission report. After he briefs the council is it customary that the other parties involved debate the following steps and their personal developments regarding the mission. The parties involved include everything from former FARC members, civil society, governmental officials, and external actors.

These meetings are then transcribed and recorded. The meetings can be found on the UN Colombia Verification Missions page. In these meetings, it has become common for civilians and members of the Government to come and deliver their cases to the council. It is customary that the parties involved discuss what has been achieved, possible outcomes, and problems that have been occurring during the past 90 days. In other words, the idea is to brief the council on any developments occurring for the last 90 days of the mission.

A UN Secretary-General report is published and addressed to the council's members before the meetings. This report includes information about implementation, i.e., transitional justice, and information about rural reforms. The UN verification mission drafts the report.

A press statement is sometimes published after the meetings, based on agreed language negotiated by the members of the council, based on a draft from Penholder UK. The press releases are produced to inform about the work that has been taking place in Colombia and about specific issues. The press releases could, for example, contain information about past and potential visits, developments, and speakers that have participated or might participate in the SC meetings[10]. Furthermore, the Secretary-General's report is posted on the verification missions webpage. Some of the statistics in the report are often

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[10] Example of a Press Release (United Nations, 2019).

turned into infographics[11] that contains information about what has been done in Colombia during the last 90 days. A simplified way of promoting information. Making it easier for civilians and parties involved to follow the final agreement's progress and ensure that correct information is provided. According to former Colombian ambassador to the UN-SC, Rugeles, press releases were essential to combat fake news[12].

The decision to extend the verification mission must be debated on a yearly basis in the council. This is done prior to the last quarterly briefing, where the council votes on a draft resolution to expand the mandate (Security Council Reports, 2023a). A subsequent resolution is produced whenever the mission needs to be expanded to include further focus. The penholder has the responsibility to draft a new resolution. However, before the final draft of the new mandate, all the members of the council consulted and briefed regarding the new mandate. The members of the council have the chance to discuss and comment on issues they wish to add or remove from the mandate. The draft resolution has almost always been approved unanimously, showing a unique consensus among the council members regarding the developments in Colombia.

4.3.3 Security Council missions
The paper will go into more detail about each mission below. It is important to keep in mind that the same procedure stated above takes place in both missions and that the two missions build on each other. The SC has taken a holistic approach to the Final Agreement in Colombia (Brubaker, 2020), where implementing one point of the Agreement subsequently leads to improvements in another point.

<u>First mission</u>
The first mission focused on the verification of the bilateral and absolute ceasefire and cessation of the hostilities and disarmament by the FARC (United Nations, n.d.). This

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[11] Example of an infographic (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2023).
[12] See annex for more information.

mission was adopted based on Resolution 2261. A Monitoring and verification Mechanism was created to verify the effectiveness of the ceasefire. The UN Secretary-Generals report, S/2016/729[13] covered the size, operational aspects, and mandate. This led to resolution 2307[14] being adopted, based on the Secretary-General's recommendations (Security Council Reports, 2020).

The mission at that time was composed of 1136 monitors, 323 FARC members, 323 National Government members, and 490 International observers from the UN (United Nations, n.d.). When it came to disarmament, specialized personnel dismantled weapons, and the left-over material was asked to be used to make monuments. One placed in Bogota, one in Havana, and one in the UN headquarters in New York. The UN mission received 8,994 weapons, 11,015 hand grenades, 3528 antipersonnel mines, 1,765,862 ammunition of different sizes, and a lot more. Once the first mission was terminated, was the second mission requested.

Second mission

The second special political mission was requested through a joint letter sent in June 2017 (S/2017/481)[15] from President Santos and FARC. The mission is known as the "United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (United Nations, n.d)."

Following the letter sent in June, resolution 2366 was adopted one month later in July, and it established the order to create the successor mission. The mission full began operations in September 2017. The Secretary-General provided the new mandate containing size and operational aspects on August 30th in S/2017/745[16]. Which

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[13] More information about; Report from the Secretary-General to the SC on the UN mission in Colombia, (S/2016/729) (United Nations Security Council, 2016c).
[14] More information about resolution (S/RES/2307) (United Nations Security Council, 2016d).
[15] More information about letter S/2017/481 (United Nations Security Council, 2017a).
[16] More information about the report from the Secretary-General to the SC on the UN mission in Colombia, (S/2017/754) (United Nations Security Council, 2017c).

subsequently led to the establishment of Resolution 2377[17]. A "slightly expanded council mandate included accompanying the parties and verifying their commitments regarding points 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement (Brubaker, 2020)". Section 3.2 on "reintegration of the FARC into civilian life: economic, social and political," and Section 3.4 "security guarantees for former combatants, their families, and communities that have suffered from the armed conflict." It also included section 5.1.2, "Verification of the sanctions imposed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP)."

According to the same letter (S/2017/481) was the goal of the mission to "engage in dialogue with relevant bodies and agencies, in particular with the commission for Follow-up, Promotion, and verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission on Security Guarantees (United Nations Security Council. (2016a)". Furthermore, would the mission have a three-year duration, with the possibility of being extended (Security Council Reports, 2016b).

The mission was further expanded in October 2017 by adopting resolution 2381. The resolution provides the mission with the role of monitoring the bilateral and temporary ceasefire (Security Council Reports, 2020).

In 2021 the mission mandate was extended to include Resolution 2574[18], which included verification of "compliance with sanctions by former FARC members, members of the security forces, civilian third parties and non-combatant state agents" as well as including SJP issued sanctions (United Nations, n.d.). The mission was at that time composed of 380 civilian personnel, both foreigners and Colombians, and 104 military and police observers (United Nations, n.d.). It is important to note that this mission continues today and does not have a definitive end date.

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[17] More information about resolution (S/RES/2377) (United Nations Security Council, 2017b).
[18] More information about resolution (S/RES/2574) (United Nations Security Council, 2021).

4.3.4 "Security Council Report"

As a support to the council, the parties, and the larger international community, the independent and impartial organization "Security Council Reports" produces various written products that are meant to put some light on the processes in Colombia and the council's follow-up.

Prior to each quarterly meeting is a detailed briefing in *What's in Blue* of the meeting published[19]. This Briefing explains who will come and speak, what developments will be discussed, and other important milestones that might occur. Simultaneously is a "monthly forecast" posted every four months. This forecast explains in detail the "Key Recent Developments" and "Expected Council Actions"[20]. The Forecast also includes information about "Key Issues and Options" and "Council Dynamics." Council dynamics refers to information about how the council as a group works, their motivations toward the mission, and eventual disagreements or worries members might have.

4.3.5 Evaluation

Based on the arguments and facts presented above, could one argue that the security council has been influential in the assistance and verification of the implementation of the peace process in Colombia. The SC has become an arena where the parties can go, discuss, express their opinion, and more. According to Brubaker (2020) "The Colombia case helped to demonstrate the role that the Council can play as a "protector of existing national peace agreements," after the parties that signed the agreement have stepped down or moved on (Brubaker 2020, p. 69)". The SC is an arena that challenges the parties involved to do everything in their power to make sure the comprehensive peace process is implemented. It allows for parties, victims, and more to come and make their case and ensures attention is placed toward the Agreement. According to a statement from former

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[19] Example of the newest quarterly meeting briefing (Security Council Reports, 2023c).
[20] Example of last monthly forecast (Security Council Reports, 2023b).

Colombian ambassador to the UN-SC Andres Rugeles, the efforts of the SC have been seen as "a positive case for Colombia and that the contributions have been great"[21].

Brubaker (2020) argues that it "has been a good practice for the mission to report back to the council on the progress towards implementing the agreement as a whole (Brubaker, 2020, p. 68)". The quarterly meetings force the parties to take an active role in the implementation and evaluation of their work. She continues to argue that it has made the parties feel obliged to account for their advancement. It is evident that the reports that are prepared subsequently ensure that development is accounted for in a written manner. The four scheduled meetings per year ensure that the council follows up and is required to direct attention toward the implementation process. It requires work to be put in place and does not allow for the mission to be deprioritized in any shape or form. Furthermore, the special representative and head of the UN verification mission also become important in ensuring that the mission does not get reduced in priority.

According to a statement from former FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo Lodoño, at the 9303rd meeting in the SC, he stated that "we acknowledge, over and over again, if not for the support of the international community, and in particular the UN, its SC and the mission in Colombia, the Duque government would not take the seriously the peace agreement or implement some of its aspects and the tempt to find a political solution with us would have failed (United Nations Security Council, 2023)"[22]. Lodoño emphasizes the importance that the SC and the UN have played in the implementation of the deal and stresses that, according to him, the process would have failed without this international intervention. This statement was put forth on the 13th of April, 2023, more than 7 years after the Final Agreement was set in motion. As read above, FARC, on numerous occasions, has had a hard time trusting governmental and international organizations. However, when Lodoño made this statement in the council, it emphasized his

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[21] See annex the conversation with Rugeles.
[22] Found at 0.29.02. (United Nations Security Council, 2023)

commitment and showed his trust in the process. The statement is truly unique and shows how vital the SC has been.

The press releases allow for not only the parties, but the international society and the Colombian citizens involved to be informed about any developments. It further focuses on combatting false information and confusion since it is the council itself that produces them. Furthermore, are the resolutions useful when the council feels the need to expand the mandate. By adopting new resolutions, the council and the mission can respond and adapt to emerging situations and, in that way, respond in a formal and organized manner. However, even though resolutions are not set in force by the rule of law, the resolutions are taken seriously and implemented regardless. The SC often uses press statements to express their support or disagreement for actions taking place in Colombia (Brubaker, 2020). The press statements speak to both those who support the peace process and those who are more skeptical.

The fact that the mission mandate must be extended each year helps the missions stay on track and ensures that the mission stays relevant with strong support from the council. Furthermore, since the SC has adopted a holistic approach to the peace process, they can signal back to the parties that "success in one area is contingent on success in others (Brubaker, 2020, p. 68)". The SC is an organized and structured institution that makes sure the implementation process is on the right track and allows for little room for other actors to come in and cause harm to the process.

Furthermore, the UN has shown "trust, credibility, and legitimacy (Calderon et al., 2017)" towards all conflict parties and local and international public opinion. Especially seen through their participation in the first mission via the MVM framework. One could argue that it has been vital that the SC has arranged visits to Colombia to gain firsthand experience, and it has reaffirmed their commitment to the process. The meetings have

allowed the civil population to come to the council and brief them on developments which have further allowed the SC to be an arena for progress.

Moreover, in a letter From Santos and FARC (S/2017/481), the two parties state that "the support of the international community and, in particular, of the United Nations through the special political mission, has been instrumental in ensuring full compliance with the agreement reached between the parties concerning the monitoring and verification of the bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and the laying down of arms (United Nations Security Council, 2017a)".

It is vital that the members of civil society are given the opportunity to brief the SC and express their concerns. When this occurs the council members often respond by issuing a press statement expressing their concerns. This allows for more attention to be placed on specific issues in the conflict. An example of this was when the council was "briefed by Clemencia Carabalí Rodallega, a representative of the Municipal Association of Women in the north of Cauca department (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2020)". She expressed her concerns over the targeting and killing of former combatants, social leaders, and more. This led to the council issuing a press statement condemning the attacks (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2020).

5. CONCLUSIONS

The paper has aimed to answer the research question: *to what extent has it been important to receive support from the UN and the UN security council, to facilitate the verification of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement?* If one would answer the question in one brief sentence. Would the answer be that the support of the UN and UN-SC has been extremely important for Colombia when verifying the implementation of the peace agreement. It has been important for all parties involved to have an external and neutral party verifying the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement.

Returning to the questions posed at the paper's start, one can understand that Colombia and the SC have been a case of good cooperation. However, it is essential to consider that the cooperation is ongoing today and will likely continue for future generations. The SC has been tasked with creating a verification mission for implementing the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and laying down arms and Reintegration of former FARC soldiers into civilian life (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, (n.d.). The two missions have been seen as a success. However, the last mission is still going on today, and there are several parts of the agreement that still needs to be implemented by the parties.

It is evident by the evidence pointed out above that the council has, on numerous occasions, been an essential arena for the parties involved. They have taken the comprehensive peace agreement and created a mechanism to ensure that the different points in the agreement are implemented to their fullest ability. Furthermore, they have been instrumental in ensuring compensation for victims' rights and reincorporating former FARC members into society. The SC, through the verification mission, has helped implement the peace process and is working on ensuring that all the victims and parties involved feel the good and bad consequences. The SC has become an arena for parties involved to discuss developments and a place that ensures neutrality. At the same time, it is possible to argue that the parties are held accountable to their own commitments in the agreement by the focus created by the SC and international attention to the agreement. Furthermore, four annual meetings and a mandatory mandate extension ensure that the implementation process is not deprioritized.

One can argue that the ongoing verification mission in Colombia, can be used in the future as a lesson of success. Of course, one cannot copy and implement the verification mission precisely as it has been implemented in Colombia in other situations. However, one can use it as a template and guidance in future design and implementations process of future peace agreements.

The Colombian peace process is a positive case showcasing international contribution and intervention. The international intervention from Norway and Cuba in the pre-peace agreement phase was essential to get the parties involved to work together and sign a peace agreement. Furthermore, the SC has been, and is continuing to be, an influential part of the implementation process in Colombia. One can argue that if it was not for these international actors and their intervention in the conflict. Could Colombia today still be in a constant spiral of failed negotiations and armed violence. However, it is essential not to forget that there is still violence today. However, the violence has become less.

Furthermore, if Colombia wishes to engage in serious negotiations with other guerrilla groups like the ELN, the Colombian Government could use its experience from the FARC process and work together with international actors as mediators, facilitators, and guarantors. If, and when, an agreement is signed with the ELN it could be argued that the parties should continue to use the UN-SC structure as a verification mechanism to ensure sustainable peace.

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7. ANNEX

The writer was lucky to participate in a class hosted by Professor Alvaro Mendez at the London School of Economics. Here we had a chance to hear from guest speaker, former UN-SC ambassador to Colombia, Andres Rugeles. Who discussed the situation in Colombia and provided his remarks from his time in the council.

Please find some reflection points that were taken under the talk of Ambassador Rugeles. The points have been valuable when writing the paper and understanding the situation in Colombia.

The role of the SC:
- Maintain the peace and security of the world.
- Role: Determine when and where the UN should have peace operations.
- Critics of the council:
    - It is difficult for all of them to agree on that.
    - Controversies at this moment: membership. And how this council should be adjusted to the new world.
    - Discussion about the veto. If they should have that power or not. It is clear that the ones who have will never renounce it.
    - Speed of the decisions.
- SC has failed in many matters, but in many cases that it's positive

"I believe it is a positive case of Colombia and that the contributions have been great."

Colombia and the UN.
- For Colombia, the UN is a unique form of deliberation and dialog.
- For peace, security, and dialogue.

- UK penholder of the sc resolution. The one who wrote the resolution and keeps writing the other resolutions. To be an articulator and mediator.
- The UK does not always write the resolutions; however, it still maintains a penholder role.
- In benefit of the process. Best interest in the whole process.
- **Main issues of discussion**:
    1. Security of ex-combatants and Guerilla leaders
    2. Reincorporation
    3. Security for social leaders and human defenders. (Still a problem today, much because of the drugs issue) (if you want to really solve the security problems, and you want to achieve peace, you'll have to solve the problem of drugs)
    4. The crop substitution
    5. Gender issues.
    6. Cross-cutting issues, ethnical, youth, children in conflict.

Colombia believes that through the UN. They can make great contributions. Colombia is a small country, you can still make a great contribution even though the size.

Why is Colombia at the UN SC?
- In the case of the verification of the peace agreement.
- Reason: when the gov and the FARC wanted to have a mechanism that gives credibility to the agreement.
- That the government wanted to fulfill its reasonability's
- Verification mission. UN accepted. Accepted with certain conditions; 90 days
- A report to the SC, follow up.
- Every year will, the mission has to be renewed. The implementation process will take at least 15 years about the progress. T

- the mission is important bc of the social reintegration process, Not easy because the state does not have a strong presence in its territory.
- That is why many guerilla groups have had a strong presence. The guerilla groups used to do the same job as the state.
- For the government of Colombia, the implementation process becomes a state policy. The policy will continue no matter who is in government and gives a strong commitment to the international society.

Meetings and press statements:
- Before every session, we had informal meetings.
- Press statements are a crucial part of the work.
- Rumors of fake information
- False info came from both sides.
    - From internal actors wanting to do damage and external actors that wanted to push and create pressure.